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Abstract 
Media plays important role in reshaping political constellation and identity in the post 
Indonesian reform era. One major event that attracted national and international media 
coverage in 2016 was “Aksi Bela Islam”, which was held to resist against Basuki Tjahja 
Purnama (Ahok) nomination as a candidate of Jakarta governor. This paper will discuss this 
event that occurred on 14 October 2016 and on subsequent demonstration that followed 
in November and December 2016. This “Aksi Bela Islam” is important to understand the 
trend and shift of identity politics of contemporary Islam and its relation to the idea of 
sharia law application in Jakarta proposed by Ahok’s contenders and citizenship (pribumi vs 
non-pribumi). This research focuses on how the discourse of “Bela Islam” (Defending Islam) 
is represented in online (national and international-based) news portal. It will explore four 
online news portal, two are national online news portal, namely Kompas and Republika 
and two others represent international online news portal, namely al Jazeera and BBC. This 
study shows that the politics of identity  of Islamic populism is on the rise in Indonesian 
context through many actions under the flag of “Bela Islam”  the year before the election 
and the issue of “pribumi vs non-pribumi” is also rising that shape the political space of 
contemporary Indonesia. 
Keywords: Aksi Bela Islam, identity politics, Islamic populism, pribumi vs non-pribumi 
 
Introduction 
The “Aksi Bela Islam” is initially held in front  of Jakarta City Hall commanded by FPI on 14 
October 2016. This demonstration was held to resist against Basuki Tjahja Purnama (Ahok) 
nomination as a candidate of Jakarta governor. This mass action was triggered by the 
alleged blasphemy done by Basuki Tjahja Purnama. This action was  then  followed by 
similar demonstration in November and December 2016. 
The FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) is understood as a radical Islamic group in Indonesia, has 
already filed a complaint against Ahok – the charge of blasphemy- with the police.  The 
complaint relates to an event on 27 September at which Ahok, having speech in a 
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campaign for his governorship election, made reference to, al-Maidah 51, a verse of the 
Quran which warns Muslims against taking Jews or Christians as allies nor leader. This 
verse of Quran is often used by Islamists group to prevent Muslims from supporting non-
Muslim, including Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) as leader/governor. Ahok is a Christian 
and ethnic Chinese, a double minority in Indonesia. Although Ahok claims that the video 
that went viral online butchered his actual speech, he has apologised for his remarks.  
In the first “Aksi Bela Islam”, the protesters led by FPI leader demanded the governor 
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama to be investigated soon for the charge of blasphemy. The 
subsequent demonstration of the Aksi Bela Islam was held on  4 November 2016, or 
popularly called as “Aksi 4 November” or “Aksi Damai 411.” This demonstration attracted 
hundred thousand Muslims from many cities and places around Java. This mass protest 
started with Friday prayer until Isya. President responded with the promise to handle the 
investigation of the blasphemy in  open court. The next action, the third Aksi Bela Islam  
was held on 2 December 2016, after Friday prayer and President Joko Widodo attended 
the demonstration at the field.   
With the event of series of Aksi Bela Islam as presented in the online news portal (Al 
Jazeera.com, BBC.com, Republika.co.id, Kompas.com) as the object of analysis, this paper 
is intended to discuss the issue of political identity constructed from the Aksi Bela Islam. 
The issue of political identity also lead to other issue of identity politics constructed 
through the Aksi Bela Islam, mainly the issue of citizenship – pribumi vs non-pribumi- in 
Indonesia.   
Some Issues Constructed from the Aksi Bela Islam 
Since the first Aksi, October 14th 2016 a number of Islam mass organization staged protest 
in front of the Police Office of Crime at Gambir and Jakarta city hall. It was led by Rizieq 
Shihab – the leader of FPI. The main issue was the demand to the government handle the 
blasphemy charge against Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. In BBC online (14 October 2016), it was 
stated that Rizieq highlighted that the protest is for defending Islam, due to Ahok’s 
blasphemic statement, insulting Quran verses. He also emphasized that the Aksi is not 
political, it is merely for defending Islam, because of Ahok’s statement blaspheming  
Quran. Although Rizieq said that it was not political, everybody believed that the target of 
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the Aksi was preventing Ahok from winning the governorship election in the following 
year.  
The other issue emerging from the Aksi is that the big number of Muslim is effectively used 
as a tool to force their interest, or in other word it uses the Islamic populism ideas to 
support their interest. To give bigger impact, the Aksi leaders (Rizieq and his companions) 
embraced more and more muslim figures, religion leaders, politicians  and Islamic groups,  
to be involved in the movement. Republika online stated in detail that the protest was 
supported by 55 mass organisations, among other are FPI -Islamic Defenders Front- and 
FBR - Forum Betawi Rempug. Although Republika (14 October 2016) stated 55 
organisations, there are only 2 of them often mentioned in the news. They demand that 
the governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama be arrested and jailed. On the other side, Ahok, 
interviewed by the journalist said that he did not care and stated, “protest is everybody’s 
right” (14 October 2016).  He even realized that he himself and his position is the target of 
the protest. Republika highlighted the power of quantity of the group  by stating 55 groups 
involved in the protest, and the number of the participants of the protest. One of the news 
from this Aksi showed that on the car stage, there are two people wearing white jubah and 
surban, giving speech, kyai Jafar Shodiq and Rizieq Shihab both of them are FPI leaders. 
Kyai Jafar Shodiq is the head of “dewan syuro” FPI.  
This first Aksi also functions to test Rizieq’s power nationally. In the years after 
reformation, 1998, FPI has popularly taken the roles as the ‘police’ to enforce syariah. This 
role often sparked debates and in many cases FPI’s action got criticism and no sympathy. 
FPI is always in the front line to show their physical power to enforce ‘Islamic syariah’ 
under the term “hisbah” (physical action to enforce syariah) in society. For example, in 
2016 there were many cases of  FPI’s sweeping the warung, restaurant which opened in 
Ramadhan time, and other case in that year in which FPI’s group of people (about 16 
people) protested to Kompas (one of the most popular Indonesian newspaper)  office 
showing their complaint on Kompas’ framing that they said disfavor of their interest. FPI 
has many branches in each of town or cities and this group os popular among its followers, 
but this group was often associated with the violence in enforcing the ‘syariah’. With such 
condition, FPI leaders need to widen its influence to reach its goal. The effort to increase 
its leverage nationally was successfully obtained through the issue of blasphemy charge 
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against Ahok, by embracing many political figures, political parties that against Ahok’s 
political stance, and religious figures that agree with the FPI’s cause.  
The important impact for FPI was that it increased its political leverage nationally through 
the series of Aksi Bela Islam. That’s why Rizieq took great effort to invite all the members 
of FPI at local levels and of other cities to join the Aksi, he also did journeys to other 
pesantren and Muslim leaders, as far as Madura and other towns and regencies in East 
Java, to invite them to the Aksi and at the same time made the issue of blasphemy sounds 
bigger and more serious.The first Aksi was successfully involving hundreds participants, 
and the leaders (Rizieq and others) were optimistic that he was able to attract greater 
mass for the next Aksi, by embracing other Islam groups. This optimistic statement at the 
same time  functioned as the “threat” that he would show the force in greater numbers.  
 At the beginning af the Aksi Bela Islam, on October 2016, the police responded in such a 
way that it seemed Police waiting for the development of the case. Police responded by 
saying that there are many different opinions about this case. Therefore  police wanted an 
open court to decide whether or not Ahok had been blaspheming Islam/Quran. On the 
other side, Purnama had accused his opponents to trick people for not voting him, a 
Christian ethnic Chinese, by using a Quranic verse, Al Maidah 51. This verse stated Muslims 
should not choose non-Muslims as allies. Ahok said that actually he criticized his political 
rivals because of using the verse, not criticizing the Quran itself (Al Jazeera, 16 November 
2016). 
In the second Aksi Bela Islam, held on 4 November 2016, the management of the 
movement was established, called GNPF-MUI (Gerakan Nasional Pendukung Fatwa MUI) – 
“National Movement Supporting MUI’s Fatwa.” The demonstration was launched after 
Jumat prayer leading to President palace and parliament building. In this Aksi, there were 
bigger number of participants, about one hundred thousands people coming from other 
places across Java island. There were some political elites, Amien Rais, Fadli Zon  and Fahri 
Hamzah,  attending the demonstration led by Rizieq Shihab.  
In this second Aksi, the name “Gerakan Nasional Pendukung Fatwa MUI” (GNPF-MUI) took 
strategic role. This group covers some Islam groups, FPI, FBR, and other Muslim groups.  
This GNPF-MUI organizes and accomodates the diversed groups with the agenda of 
enforcing the MUI fatwa, that is “punishment for the perpetrator of blasphemy”. This 
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group leads the protest to be better organized and more powerful, managing the protest 
from the field coordinator and local / city coordinators. This group functions as the 
management of the Aksi Bela Islam at Jakarta and other places, including managing the 
fund for the action. 
The demonstration of 4 November run well until 18.00.  President appreciated that the 
demonstration was under control, although it involved hundred thousands people. 
President Joko Widodo thanked to all of the leader and people participating in the Aksi.  
This good situation changed when the mass started to dismiss themselves. It was getting 
chaotic at about 19.00 especially in front of presidential palace.  However, the police was 
able to control the chaos and dismiss the mass at 21.00.  The President was not happy with 
this chaos and he said that there were some political actors behind the mass chaos which 
happened not only in front of Presidential palace but also in Penjaringan, North Jakarta, in 
which a minimarket at Kampung Luar Batang was looted. President, after a meeting with 
some ministers, gave his promise that Ahok’s case of blasphemy will be taken care quickly 
and transparently. “In the meeting, it has been discussed, the legal process towards Basuki 
Tjahaja Purnama that will be conducted firmly, quickly, and transparently. For that reason,  
I am asking the protesters to go home to your home-town safe and sound,” said Jokowi 
(Republika, 4 November 2016). 
The third Aksi Bela Islam, 2 December 2016, was launched in the morning up to afternoon 
after Jumat prayer, having the same agenda, the demand of Ahok’s arrest. In the BBC 
observation, however, there are some of the protesters only wanted to join the Jumat 
prayer, and not interested in the main agenda (BBC, 2 December 2016).  In other word, 
some of the participant of the protest is interested in the Aksi because of enjoying the 
situation of performing prayer together with a lot of people and friends at public space (at  
squares and streets), a happy moment that Muslim usually enjoyed only twice a year, 
during Idul Fitri and Idul Adha prayers which is not as big event as this moment. The happy 
feeling was constructed because of the togetherness like in a big festival that is a rare 
occasion for common people living in the busy big city like Jakarta, in which its heavy traffic 
reaches at the level of frustrating for all of the inhabitants. 
In this third Aksi Bela Islam, the important issue is the government, represented by 
President Jokowi enforced its roles, controlling the Aksi. The politically important moment  
in this Aksi happened as the top of the Aksi, when President Jokowi coming to the Monas 
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square where the Jumat prayer would be held. Bringing blue umbrella because of rain,  
Jokowi walked from Presidential palace to the square and joined the Jumat prayer. 
Jokowi’s decision to come to the arena of protest has been calculated politically. His 
coming to the arena of demonstration on foot from the Presidential palace, accompanied 
by Jusuf Kalla (vice president) and other fellows (a few police and military men), attracted 
the mass in the square and journalists.  All of sudden, the whole attention went to his 
coming to that arena. After doing Jumat prayer together, Jokowi looked relaxed and 
smiling stepping to the stage and gave his brief speech addressing the people there. He 
successfully embraced the audience. For this event, BBC wrote that “Aksi 212 dipuncaki 
Jokowi salat bersama massa.” The word “dipuncaki” means that Jokowi placed himself at 
the top  of the “show,” implying that it is Jokowi who win the game. 
In that stage, Presiden Joko Widodo greeted the ummah (Islamic term referring to the 
Muslim people anywhere), conveying thanks to the protesters of 2 December 2016 (212) 
who have done the protest smoothly, in a good order. The audience welcomed him happily 
and the president also thanked for the prayers  for the nations peace. This is a smart 
response of the president, because the protesters in fact staged protest and 
demonstration to pressure the president to arrest Ahok (when Jokowi was the governor of 
Jakarta, Ahok was his vice governor) and punish him because of his blasphemy. The 
President, on the other side, did not respond in confrontative manner, instead he acted 
like a star among the crowd so that people welcomed and were happy with his attendance, 
and he controlled the situation.   
President Jokowi’s coming to the demonstration arena strategically built a political 
communication between Jokowi and Muslim people. First it showed that he paid attention 
to the people’s demand. He also wanted to show his empathy through his brief speech 
asking the people to go home sound and safe, and this was also to show the audience that 
“I am on your side” instead of “I am the target of your protest.”  His coming and his gesture 
also showed that he had the power to control the situation and the people as well as the 
Muslim groups. President Jokowi’s decision to approach the protesters also swept away 
the assumption constructed in the previous Aksi in which it was stated that he did not 
want to respond the Aksi seriously, including not accepting the protesters petition by 
himself.  
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The interesting issue following the Aksi Belas Islam III, was that the police arrested seven 
people with the alleged treason charge (makar). The division of public relation of 
Indonesian  Police, Inspektur Jenderal Boy Rafli Amar said that, Police had arrested seven  
people charged of treason (Kompas.com,3 December 2016). He explained further that the 
treason is not the same as criticism. Those charged with alleged treason planned to 
conduct special session (sidang istimewa) to topple down the government. In this case, the 
Police found out that the seven people tried to make the use of the mass action “Aksi of 2 
December” to topple the government. Those seven people are, Rachmawati 
Soekarnoputri, Kivlan Zein, Ratna Sarumpaet, Adityawarman, Eko, Alvin, dan Firza Huzein. 
They were charged with the  “Pasal 107 jo Pasal 110 jo Pasal 87 KUHP.”  
Trend and Shift of Identity Politics of Contemporary Islam; New Islamic Populism   
The identity politics of contemporary Islam is a continuation and change from previous era. 
In the post-Suharto era, Indonesia witnesses many religious organisations and movements 
remained linked to state institutions and had a remarkable degree of influence over state 
actors (Ricklefs, 2012:465).  In many cases as Ricklefs observed, in enforcing the MUI’s 
fatwa  the President and the police acted as if they had the force of legislation.  Populism 
refers to the ideas that Hadiz (2016) stated, that it involves  the mobilisation and 
homogenisation of a range of disparate grievances of the ‘masses’ against identified ‘elites’ 
(Hadiz, 2016; 2)  
In the series of Aksi Bela Islam, it mobilized a range of Islam groups, from members of the 
FPI, HTI, Muhammadiyah, NU, and other Islamic groups. Although institutionally 
Muhammadiyah and NU did not support the Aksi, the members from the Islamic 
organization are involved in the series of Aksi and in the GNPF-MUI (organization that 
emerged in the Second Aksi of 4 November). The various Islamic groups with disparate 
ideological background were involved in one place with similar look (white dress and 
clothes) sharing one agenda. As a populist movement, this GNPF-MUI construct “one face 
of Islam” and any identities constructed in the movement gave an effect of homogenizing 
the disparate Islamic groups.   
The Islamic populism in its historical trajectories covers and merges the interests, and 
aspirations, as well as  grievances different  social classes. The social bases is important 
aspect to examine the form of islamic populism. The different social base in the 
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contemporary case and the older one will build different form of the older and newer 
Islamic populism. The older form of Islamic  populism had been more fully rooted in the 
traditional urban and rural petty bourgeoisie and significantly shapes Islamic politics in the 
contemporary era (Hadiz, 2016; 2).  
The rising of the conservative group or Islamist  group is mainly attributed to the leader of 
the Aksi. In one of its article in Al Jazeera (16 November 2016) , it is said that these series 
of demonstration show the rising of conservative group or what it called Islamist group,  
“...an extremely big show of force by Islamist groups who have been gaining importance in 
Indonesia over the years.” The rising of the so called islamist group  is considered a threat 
to secular state of Indonesia, in which the conservative here refers to the Muslim group 
such as FPI and other groups supporting the action. 
The terms of conservative or Islamist group is due to the fact that the demonstration was 
innitiated and led by FPI leader, Rizieq Shihab, since the first Aksi. In addition, it is well 
known that FPI is an Islamic organization with a particular characteristic as strongly 
represent itself as the group that struggle for the application of syariah. FPI’s headquarter 
is in Jakarta, established on  17 Agustus 1998 at Pondok Pesantren Al Umm, Ciputat 
Tanggerang, Jakarta, with its formal address at Jalan Petamburan III No. 17 Tanah Abang, 
Jakarta, close to the home of “Imam Besar” FPI,  Habib Rizieq Shihab 
(http://www.fpi.or.id/p/organisasi-fpi-untuk-pertama-kalinya.html).  
In its web-site,  it is stated the vision and mission of the FPI mainly, applying Islamic syariah 
in a whole (“kaaffah”), under the Khilaafah Islamiyyah according to Manhaj Nubuwwah, 
through Da’wah, enforcing the “Hisbah” and do the Jihad (http://www.fpi.or.id/p/visi-
misi.html). “Hisbah” means direct action or phisical action against anything against Islamic 
law. 
FPI also has internal groups, called as the independent groups under the umbrella of FPI  
(with its own AD/ART). They are Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI); Mujahidah Pembela Islam 
(MPI); Front Mahasiswa Islam (FMI); dan Serikat Pekerja Front (SPF). The organization 
under FPI popularly known in the public as paramilitary group, Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI), 
which often do the action "to make  order" (by sweeping) against the activities that it 
considers as against Islamic syariah, such as the sweeping of warung, restaurant or cafe at 
Ramadhan months.   
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Since the first Aksi Bela Islam, it is designed as a kind of show of force from the particular 
Islam group, FPI. This can be seen from the number of the people stage demonstration. 
The leader of the protest is Habib Rizieq, the FPI leader (Islamic Defender Front) and    
accompanied by other Kyais such as Jafar Shodiq). The leaders of the movement 
successfully mobilized the people across Java to come and attend the demonstration. 
Many pictures from all of the online newspapers show hundred thousands people 
gathered at Monas, Bundaran HI,  “whitening” Jakarta, describing the biggest number of 
demonstration in the October, November and December 2016. This pictures are iconic and 
circulated among many online and printed medias, newspaper, magazine, television, and 
social medias, giving the illustration of the quantity “force” of Muslim group dominating 
the landscape of Jakarta. 
The photos in medias represent the ideas of that quantitatively, Muslim is group with big 
number and this is a strength to pursue their interest. From many photographs taken by 
journalists who shot the demonstration in that unique ways, the Jakarta in white, all places 
filled by  hundred thousands people wearing white clothes blocking the main streets such 
as surrounding Bundaran HI, Monas, and all other streets in Jakarta. The streets were 
closed and occupied by thousands of people. The pictures of Jakarta in white -because of 
the hundred thousands protesters - implies that Muslim want to control the space, by 
occupying the main public places and streets. In addition to the number, the power is 
shown through the control of the public spaces such as main roads and streets. 
 
It is estimated 150,000 people gather for demonstration (4 November 2016).   
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In addition to the number of people involved in the Aksi Bela Islam and the 
occupation of the public spaces such as Jakarta’s main streets, the show of force is also 
demonstrated through the discourse that is launched by the protesters. The discourse is 
the punishment for the blasphemy. The protesters believed that Basuki Tjahaja Purnama 
(Ahok) did the blasphemy through his speech at Kepulauan Seribu. The orators and leaders 
of the Aksi, mainly Habib Rizieq, strongly articulated to the audience that what Ahok has 
said is a blasphemy, sothat Ahok must be arrested and punished. This can be seen from the 
speeches and the pamflet or banner that the protesters brought during the Aksi.  One of 
the photograph of the Aksi can be seen in the following picture. 
 
In the picture above, we can see the protesters were enthusiastic, with serious 
expression, in joining the protest, by yelling aloud, raising their fists and equipping 
themselves with banners or pamflets with the words to punish Ahok, “Tangkap Ahok”  
(Arrest Ahok), “Aksi Bela Islam III: Tangkap dan Hukum Ahok - Penista Al Quran”, with the 
picture of Ahok of which is crossed, “Jangan Ada Penista Islam di Indonesia”  (No Islamic 
blasphemy in Indonesia). All of the pamflet or banner says the same thing, persecuting 
Ahok for the blasphemy. They wore  white clothes, white “kopyah” (hat) and some of them 
brought ‘black-white’ flags, the identity of the FPI and hard-line Islamic group.  These 
hundred thousands protesters shows the majority common Muslim in Indonesia who are 
able to do and share the same things, chanting, praying, and carrying banners with one 
purpose to topple down Ahok on blasphemy charges (Al Jazeera, 2 December 2016).   
The protesters did not think other ways, instead they believed that  Ahok did the 
blasphemy so he deserved for the heavy punishment. By calling Ahok as “Penista Al 
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Quran,”  it seemed that the vonis has been final, no other argument. Therefore, the series 
of Aksi Bela Islam function as the trial by the mass, in which the protesters (in big numbers) 
forced their opinion that Ahok is guilty of blasphemy. 
The people joining the demonstration were very proud of what they have done. 
This can be seen from the articles of all the newspaper that wrote their interview of the 
participants of the demonstration. They came to Jakarta from towns and villages around 
Jakarta and West Java, as well as from far away, even with a big effort. Many people 
interviewed in the online medias said that they got a feeling of importance by attending 
and joining a historical moment, feeling involved in that big event. They felt the 
importance of involving in this arena, due to the facts that most of them are common 
people whom in their daily life they are never involved in such important “political events.” 
They are common people who are busy with making a living in their daily life by being 
farmers, small traders - selling and buying in traditional market and other informal jobs 
that they can leave relatively easily. Nevertheless, a few of them are rich enough and 
supported the demonstration by buying the train tickets for others who can not afford it, 
or renting cars or buses to transport them to Jakarta.    
Under the banner of “Aksi Bela Islam” the leader of FPI went to the cities across 
Java, meeting ulamas in many pesantrens and other Muslim groups to get their support for 
the Aksi. The pesantren and  many Islam groups are encouraged to join the demonstration, 
to show the solidarity as Muslim and the Muslim’s force.  In the effort of gaining the 
support widely, they built the issue of Muslim’s being marginalized economically and 
politically. These issues were effective enough to build solidarity among the Muslim.  The 
feeling that as majority of Muslim are not empowered, even marginalized in many aspects 
of life especially economy and political life, were spread and developed so that the Aksi 
was  perceived as a tool to empower the majority Muslim and bring the Muslim to center 
politically and economically.  To show their support, many Muslim groups in almost all 
other cities and areas sent their “jamaah” to Jakarta in big numbers. In addition, in some 
cities, the similar demonstrations were conducted. For example, in Malang the Islam 
groups staged demonstration after Jumat prayer by gathering at Masjid Jami’ wearing 
white clothes as dress code, articulating the similar issues.    
 Many online medias, nationally and internationally, are also interested in 
presenting pictures of people in close-up showing who the people joining demonstration 
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are. This shows the force of Muslim, quantitatively and qualitatively. They are common 
Muslim people, coming from cities and villages across Java. They came from East Java cities 
and villages, thousands people leaving from Banyuwangi, Malang, Pasuruan, Mojokerto, 
Surabaya, Madiun, Ngawi and others. And from Central Java, Solo, Sukoharjo, Sragen, 
Klaten, Semarang, Tegal, Jogjakarta (DIY), and others. From West Java thousands of people 
are from Ciamis, Sukabumi, Tasikmalaya,  and others. Most of them are traveling in groups 
by bus or cars or train. A Few of them heroically took a walk from nearby town. Some of 
them came to Jakarta for the first time. The young people from villages and towns far from 
Jakarta felt excited to be in the place. This big number of people shows the force in 
quantity of Muslim in Java. The people also shows that they are common majority people 
who go for the aksi because of the feeling that they have to do that as part of their 
religious “duty” or because their ustad asked them to go for Aksi. This face of protesters is 
different from the people who are commonly hired for demonstration in the city of 
Jakarta, who got  money by joining a demonstration.  These differences contributed to the 
success of show of force for the series of Aksi.  
 
The Politics of “Pribumi VS Non-Pribumi” 
The series of Aksi Bela Islam from October up to December 2016 (three months) and  the 
sporadic action following the Aksi brought about bad impact for Basuki Tjahaja Purnama  
politically, who had previously got a high level of electability. Due to the pressure of the 
Aksi and the conservative group, he suffered from an adversed blow, he was charged of  
blasphemy, persecuted, and defetead in the  governorship election, ended in the two years 
in jail.   
Not only the political defeat of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama in the governorship election, this 
new Islamic populism also raised the issue “pribumi – non pribumi.” Literally, “pribumi” 
means “indigenous”, and in the Islamic identity politics, it does not refer to the 
indigeneous people, instead it is used as a tool to define the favourable repositioning of  
“ummah.” The term “ummah” refers to Muslim people across the world, borderless. In this 
political context the term refers to the Indonesian Muslim, which is in the position of 
marginalised group vis a vis the elites (Indonesian government).  
The repositioning of ummah within the confines of the nation state need to be struggled 
for through any possible strategies of contestation. The contestation does not necessarily 
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involve the overt call to establish a state based on Islamic law, the Sharia (Hadiz, 2016;3). 
This moment of the governorship election is used as the chance to build contestation 
against the government elites, which is considered as ‘not Islamic’ and at the same time as 
the chance to unify the marginalised ‘ummah’. Therefore, the issue of ‘pribumi-non 
pribumi’ is projected to gain the Muslim’s trust and develop Muslim’s economic and 
political access.  
The series of Aksi Bela Islam, in addition to the charge of blashphemy,  highlighted the 
issue of “Pribumi vs Non-pribumi,” with the description of Muslims attending the 
demonstration were predominantly common people, mostly the “jamaah” of Mosque, or 
Pengajian (religious teaching groups), and common people in their daily life. A few people 
that belongs to the elite in this group  is the leader of mass organisation involved in the 
Aksi Bela Islam, the Kyais and the leader of religious teaching or mosque jamaah.  The 
majority “jamaah” are common people who has no big capital nor access politically nor 
economically. This implies that the majority have no control economically, instead, most of 
the people are those who need to be empowered.  
This issue of economically and politically marginalized majority Muslim was developed into 
the issue of “pribumi – non-pribumi,” in which Indonesia is a country with Muslim 
dominant group, but it is a secular country, and Ahok is a Chinese Christian belongs to 
minority group. Many times did Al Jazeera state that Indonesia is predominantly Muslim 
but it acknowledged six religions and dozens of ethnic traditional religous groups. 
However, the politics of majority-minority works in many areas. This political term of 
majority is associated with ‘pribumi’, or Muslim majority while the minority group is 
associated with the non-pribumi (non-native) such as Chinese. The politics of “pribumi and 
non-pribumi” is associated with the majority and minority Muslim groups. This political 
claim said that Muslim is pribumi – majority (quantitatively), while non-Muslim is non-
pribumi, minority.  
The politics of pribumi and non-pribumi was obviously employed  particularly  in the Aksi 
Bela Islam, prior Jakarta governorship election, with the position of Basuki Tjahaja 
Purnama as the non-pribumi, Chinese Christian minority.  The allegation of  insulting the 
Quran while campaigning for elections of the Jakarta governorship  was the trigger to 
defeat him in the following year governorship election. The issue of blasphemy is the most 
effective blow for defeating the candidate of governorship. Muslim across Java are 
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prompted in anger – (Al Jazeera claims both moderate and conservative Muslim) so that 
this demonstration was able to invite more than 100,000 protesters to the Jakarta streets 
on November 4, demanding that Basuki Purnama be prosecuted. “Muslim groups want 
Purnama, a member of Indonesia's Christian minority, prosecuted for allegedly insulting 
the Quran” (Al Jazeera, 16 November 2016).  
The issue of pribumi and non-pribumi here is closely related to the control of economy and 
politics in which the non-pribumi (minority group, Chinese) is assumed to be the dominant 
power economically. On the other hand, the majority is the pribumi who has no economic 
power. In such context of intersection betwen the numbers of Muslim - Christians, and 
economic access, BBC produced the news article discussing about  the impact of the 
demonstration a day before the demonstration of 2 December (Aksi 212). The title of the 
news is “Aksi demo 411, 212, dan 'efek trauma' yang membayangi pengusaha,” the 
demonstration of 411, 212 and ‘traumatic effect’ haunting the business (1 Dec 2016). 
The discourse of “pribumi and non-pribumi” has almost always related with the dynamic of 
economy and politics in the history. Political assumption was that the pribumi (native 
Indonesian) is the group that is marginalized economically and in many cases, also 
politically. On the other hand, the “non-pribumi” which is politically associated with 
Chinese, is the group that commonly assumed as controlling the economy of the country 
especially in Java. In almost all big markets across Java, the Chinese are dominant group.  
They control the production (factories), distribution and marketing of basic need goods 
and services. The Chinese business has dominated over Indonesian economy since the 
beginning of New Order (Honna in Ricklefs, 2012:245).  
The political term “pribumi” refers to indigeneous people or Javanese or local people, is 
always associated with the people who are defeated economically and politically. Majority 
are poor and depend on the production chain that they can not control. Most of the poor 
people are farmers, labors in factories, and migrant labors, or the consumers.  Powerless 
position leads them to be “nothing to lose” position. They, for instance, can go to Jakarta 
for a few days not worrying about the money for their family, in which  most of the men 
are breadwinners.  This is not because they had enough money, but mostly they are not 
tied with permanent or formal job. 
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Traumatic effect as the headline of BBC (1 December 2016) highlighted the effect of the 
protest of Aksi Bela Islam for the economic and business sectors.  It is said that the 
business in Jakarta did not feel any relaxed, instead, they were worried much facing the 
demonstration on 2 December. BBC wrote that the demonstration in previous month had 
made them traumatic. Many business person, especially Chinese business men went out of 
Jakarta temporarily.  The trauma for the Chinese was especially rooted from the similar 
event in 1998 Jakarta, a chaotic situation that used the issue of pribumi and non-pribumi. 
The demonstration that toppled down the New Order regime brought about the chaotic 
situation in Jakarta and almost all cities across Java, in which they had to migrated to other 
states such as Singapore, Malaysia and Australia, leaving their business and some were 
destroyed by the mob.  
The mass action of demonstration in a big number is always traumatic for the “non-
pribumi” or Chinese, moreover, when the Aksi started to highlight the issue of pribumi and 
non-pribumi, as automatically related to economic marginalization and domination. In such 
traumatic chaotic situation, the minority Chinese  felt that they were fragile, easily become 
target of the mass amock. Sothat most of the Chinese, in such situation, thought to save 
their life, their family members, and leaving the business closed prior to the Aksi. One day 
before the Aksi of 2 December (Aksi 212)  some of the Chinese business person in Jakarta 
planned to close their business to go for several days to other cities or places such as Bali 
and other places where they have  family of friends, while watching the situation at home 
from far away. 
In sum, as written by BBC in its article on1 December 2016, the Aksi Bela Islam in October, 
November and December brought about bad impact on the business persons and economy 
at large, because the impact is not only for the Chinese business but also for the economic 
stakeholders (the business owners, staffs, other related business/stores, consumers). The 
trauma of previous mass action in 1998 that gave impact on business destruction, looting 
the stores, and sexual abuse as well as rapes, made the Jakartan Chinese worried, anxious,   
and this forced them to prepare to flee to other neighbouring countries. BBC’s reporting 
on the impact of the Aksi to the business, was also strengthened  by the interview with the 
Head of Indonesian Textile Association, Ade Sudradjat that supported the idea criticizing 
the demonstration with large numbers of mass protest to give pressure to the government 
always brought about traumatic effect. He said, about 50% of the Chinese business were 
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prepared to flee, leaving their business activities and their properties to other cities or 
other relatively safe places. The close of business will affect the  run of economy,  the halt 
of distribution of good and services. Not only was this harmful for the businessmen and 
distributors, but also for hundred or thousands workers involved in the economic and 
busines activities (BBC, 1 December 2016).   
Those economic impact of the Aksi Belas Islam was closely related to the issue of pribumi 
and non-pribumi that was spread and highlighted in the campaign. The control of public 
spaces with the big numbers of participant in the Aksi also triggered the other groups to 
launch similar Aksi. For example, the following days, on Sunday there was another  group 
launched similar Aksi, such as KSPI (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia) did the Aksi of 
protest  in Jakarta with at least 50.000 workers from Jabodetabek, Karawang and 
Purwakarta. There was also another group did demonstration to counter the Aksi Bela 
Islam. The group named Aksi Nusantara Bersatu held its aksi on 30 November in all areas 
across Indonesia. In Jakarta it was centralized at Monas square. The main ideas of this aksi 
is to revive the spirit of Bhineka Tunggal Ika. In some ways this aksi showed the  rising 
competition for the social and political space.    
The issue of pribumi and non-pribumi not only used as the tools in political campaign for 
the election of the governorship in Jakarta. This issue also effectively impacted on the 
economic and business as well as the social cultural impact. The trauma due to the 
violence suffered by the ethnic Chinese in 1998 in which the ethnic Chinese as the victim of 
violence all the sudden haunted the people, so that they did not only close their business, 
but also flee to other cities and places safe for them. Until now, the issue of “pribumi and 
non-pribumi” is still politically articulated by the elected governor, Anies Baswedan for 
political reason, mainly strengthen his political position and his ties with its conservative 
Islamic supporters.  
In sum, it can be said that the relationship between the new Islamic populism political 
agenda and democratic procedures and rights in Indonesian contemporary economic and 
political sphere is highly contingent as it is with acceptance of the precepts of the 
neoliberal world order.  The contingency here means that the result depends on the 
outcomes of social conflict within specific constellations of power and interests (Hadiz, 
2016: page 3). However, from the Aksi Bela Islam, it is obvious that social conservatism 
serves as a major marker of Islamic political identity. 
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Conclusion 
The covering of the event Aksi Bela Islam 2016 obviously constructed the identity 
politics of the conservative Muslim group. Al Jazeera which does a sharp analysis, 
highlighted the aksi as the means for Muslim group (FPI) to leverage its position nationally 
and this needs to get attention as it is a threat to the Indonesian secular state in the long 
run.  FPI is considered as a conservative and radical Islamist group because of its vision and 
mission, in which it supports and struggles for the khilafah system and its policy of 
“hisbah”, a physical response against anything breaking the Islamic law (syariah).  
The concern of the rising conservative groups with its identity politics brought 
about the issue of “pribumi vs non-pribumi” and the adversed economic impact of the Aksi 
Bela Islam, with the unproductive  effect of economy and business in Jakarta, because of 
the ethnic Chinese business people’s trauma on the social an political chaotic 
demonstration involving large number of participants. Most of economy and business run 
by ethnic Chinese were all closed and this brought effect on the temporary halt of 
production and distribution of goods and service since the ethnic Chinese dominated the 
economy and business in Jakarta. 
The discourse of pribumi and non-pribumi is proven to be effectively applied in the 
campaign for the governorship of Jakarta. This discourse of pribumi-non pribumi and the 
charge of blasphemy completely defeat Basuki Tjahaja Purnama - the incumbent governor 
of Jakarta, in the second round of governor election. This issue of “pribumi and non-
pribumi” is not used as the term referring to  indigeneousity, instead it is used as a political  
term. This issue is still used in the recent discourse when the elected governor of Jakarta, 
Anies Baswedan was inaugurated for the position as the governor of Jakarta. This means 
that the discourse of “pribumi and non-pribumi” is used to politically othering their enemy.  
Nevertheless, the impact of the Aksi Bela Islam shows that the projected political and 
economic reforms did not much taken place, instead it  signs the rising social conservatism  
as Islamic political identity. the new Islamic populism political agenda and democratic 
procedures and rights in Indonesian is highly related to and depends on the acceptance of 
the neoliberal world order.  It means that the result of the “movement” depends on the 
outcomes of social conflict within specific constellations of power and interests (Hadiz, 
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2016:3). However, from the Aksi Bela Islam, it is obvious that social conservatism 
continuously serves as a major marker of Indonesian Islamic political identity. 
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